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Abstract
Research has widely explored the differences between conservatives and liberals, and it has been also recently
demonstrated that conservatives display different reactions toward valenced stimuli. However, previous studies have not
yet fully illuminated the cognitive underpinnings of these differences. In the current work, we argued that political ideology
is related to selective attention processes, so that negative stimuli are more likely to automatically grab the attention of
conservatives as compared to liberals. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that negative (vs. positive) information impaired
the performance of conservatives, more than liberals, in an Emotional Stroop Task. This finding was confirmed in Experiment
2 and in Experiment 3 employing a Dot-Probe Task, demonstrating that threatening stimuli were more likely to attract the
attention of conservatives. Overall, results support the conclusion that people embracing conservative views of the world
display an automatic selective attention for negative stimuli.
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Introduction
‘‘All people are born alike - except Republicans and Democrats’’ (Groucho
Marx)
As remarked by Groucho Marx, political conservatives and
liberals often present dramatic differences. Research in the last
decades has widely investigated the distinguishing features of
these opposing ideologies in various domains. For instance,
conservatives and liberals tend to display different personality
profiles (e.g. [1,2]), and even facial features [3]. In addition,
political ideology is related to differences in cognitive styles (e.g.,
need for closure, structure, and order) [4]. For instance,
conservatives show greater neurocognitive sensitivity to changes
in habitual patterns of response [5], tend to more rigidly organize
their living and working spaces [6], and express preferences for
simple and easily interpretable pieces of art [7], whereas liberals
display more integrative complexity and tolerance of ambiguity
[4].
Remarkable differences between conservatives and liberals also
emerge in relation to the perception of the world as dangerous
and threatening [8,9]. Interestingly, structural MRI data
demonstrated that conservatives have an increased gray matter
volume of the right amygdala [10], a brain structure involved in
the processing of threatening information [11]. This suggests that
individuals embracing conservative political views might be more
sensitive to signals of threat, and display avoidance regulatory
strategies, that is an orientation focused on the prevention of
negative outcomes at both a personal and group level [12,13]. In
line with this idea, it has been recently found that conservatives
display higher changes in skin conductance, as compared to
liberals, when they are presented with threatening stimuli (e.g., a
bloody face) [14]. A further relevant demonstration has been
provided by Shook and Fazio [15] who nicely showed that,
conservatives and liberals explore novel situations differently,
with the former being more cautious and more likely to display
learning asymmetries, namely a tendency to learn negative items
relatively better than positive items. A third line of research [16]
indicates that conservatives are more likely to interpret
ambiguous facial stimuli as expressing threatening emotions. In
impression formation tasks, conservatives, as compared to
liberals, give also more weight to negative as compared to
positive information [17]. Overall, these findings consistently
make evident the existence of a link between political ideology
and the processing of valenced information. However, previous
studies have not yet fully enlightened the cognitive underpinnings
of the differential reactions to positive and negative stimuli as a
function of political ideology. Indeed, the aforementioned results
might stem from intentional and conscious processes that
prioritize either positive or negative information. It should be
noted that in the work by Oxley and colleagues [14], changes in
skin conductance were assessed after prolonged exposure to either
threatening or non-threatening stimuli, whereas startle-blink
responses were related to sudden noises and not to intrinsically
threatening stimuli.
Therefore, it is critical to get underneath the observed effects
described in literature and disambiguate whether they are based
on higher-level cognitive processes or basic attentional processes.
In the current studies, we explored whether conservatives and
liberals automatically respond in a different way to positive and
negative stimuli. More specifically, we tested the hypothesis that
conservatives, as compared to liberals, are characterized by
stronger automatic selective attention toward negative stimuli.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e26456In Experiment 1, we relied on a modified version of the Stroop
task [18]. This experimental paradigm allows us to identify the
extent to which an irrelevant stimulus feature attracts the attention
and interferes with the execution of the primary task. Participants
were required to define the color of the font of positive and
negative words, so that to assess how the irrelevant stimulus
valence automatically attracted participants’ attention (i.e.,
Emotional Stroop Task) [19–20]. As mentioned above, we
predicted that conservative political views would correlate with
the attention-grabbing power of negative as compared to positive
information.
Methods
Experiment 1
Participants. Forty-five students (43 female; age M=20.16,
SD=3.96) participated in the experimental study in exchange of
course credits. The experiment was conducted in accordance with
the guidelines laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and with
the indications of the local ethical committee. Participants were
fully informed about the structure of the study and their rights, and
provided an oral consent prior to taking part in the experiment.
Procedure. Political ideology was assessed during a class
session some weeks before participation to the main study.
Participants (N=166) were asked to express their agreement
(from 1=‘‘not at all’’ to 7=‘‘very much’’) towards 6 social issues
(i.e., reduction of immigration, abortion, medically assisted
procreation, homosexual marriage, use of arms for personal
defense, adoption by homosexual couples; a=.70). Responses
were rescaled so that higher scores corresponded to more
conservative views (Mean of the experimental sample=3.67,
SD=1.11). Data from a different sample (N=40) showed that
responses to the ideology scale are correlated with political
affiliation as measured on a 10 cm continuum (from left-wing to
right-wing), r(40)=.62, p,.001.
In the laboratory study, participants performed an Emotional
Stroop Task. They were presented with 20 positive (e.g., love,
peace, nice, honesty, friendship, harmony, joy, pleasure, paradise,
quiet, sincerity, happiness, wonderful, balanced, peacefulness,
order, stability, freedom, security, serenity) and 20 negative words
(e.g., anger, hate, vomit, horrible, disorder, disgust, horror,
contempt, pain, accident, disaster, suffering, sickness, dirty,
repulsion, terror, awful, evil, threatening, grief); half of both
positive and negative words were printed in blue, whereas the
other half was printed in red. What specific words were printed in
red or blue was counterbalanced across participants. Overall,
participants were presented with 200 trials in a random order and
they were asked to quickly and accurately categorize the color in
which the words were written while ignoring their meaning. If the
valence of the word automatically attracts the attention, the
performance in the color-naming task is expected to be impaired.
Each word was visible at the centre of the screen until response
(ISI=150 ms). At the top of the screen, two black labels (e.g.,
‘‘D=red’’ and ‘‘K=blue’’ or vice-versa) always reminded the
meaning of the response keys. Next, participants were asked to
evaluate the valence of the 40 words (from 1=‘‘extremely
positive’’ to 7=‘‘extremely negative’’). Finally, they were thanked
and fully debriefed during a class lesson.
Experiment 2
Participants. Forty students (16 female) aged between 20
and 28 years (M=22.40, SD=1.81) participated in the study on a
voluntary basis. The experiment was conducted in accordance
with the guidelines laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and
with the indications of the local ethical committee. Participants
were fully informed about the structure of the study and their
rights, and provided a written consent prior to taking part in the
experiment. It was stressed that they could freely leave the study at
any time, but all participants completed it.
Procedure. Participants initially reported their agreement
(from 1=‘‘not at all’’ to 7=‘‘very much’’) towards 10 social issues
(i.e., reduction of immigration, abortion, medically assisted
procreation, homosexual marriage, adoption by homosexual
couples, legalization of soft drugs, euthanasia, globalization, use
of stem cells, environmental pollution; a=.78). Responses were
rescaled so that higher scores corresponded to more conservative
views (M=3.34, SD=.94).
Afterwards, the Dot-Probe Task was introduced. Participants
were instructed that on each trial, two different pictures would
briefly appear (i.e., 500 ms) on the computer screen one next to
the other (one on the left- and one on the right-side of the
computer screen, followed by a small grey dot on either the left- or
right-side of the screen. On each trial a positive and a negative
image were simultaneously presented. Overall, 8 positive (number
1440, 1710, 2070, 4626, 5030, 5779, 5831, 7325; e.g., a flower, a
baby) and 8 negative images (number 1300, 1930, 2120, 2811,
5970, 6560, 8480, 9440; e.g., an hurricane; a shark) from the
International Affective Picture System [21] were used. Negative
pictures were slightly more arousing than positive pictures, but the
difference was not statistically significant. Negative and positive
pictures randomly appeared on the right- or left-side of the screen.
Overall, participants went through 64 trials, and the dot appeared
in the same spatial location of the negative image in half of the
trials. Participants were asked to quickly determine the spatial
location of the dot by pressing a key on the computer keyboard
(‘‘D’’ and ‘‘K’’ when the dot was on the left- or right-side,
respectively).
Finally, participants rated the valence of each picture (from
1=‘‘extremely positive’’ to 7=‘‘extremely negative’’), before
being thanked and debriefed.
Experiment 3
Participants. Twenty-two students (17 female) aged between
18 and 23 years (M=19.41, SD=1.01) participated in the study in
exchange of course credits. The experiment was conducted in
accordance with the guidelines laid down in the Declaration of
Helsinki and with the indications of the local ethical committee.
Participants were fully informed about the structure of the study
and their rights, and provided a written consent prior to taking
part in the experiment.
Procedure. A couple of weeks before participation to the
laboratory study, participants were asked to complete a
questionnaire during a class session. First of all, participants
(N=165) were asked to express their agreement (from 1=‘‘not at
all’’ to 7=‘‘very much’’) towards 15 social and economic issues
(i.e., reduction of immigration, abortion, medically assisted
procreation, homosexual marriage, adoption by homosexual
couples, globalization, soft drugs, industrial relations, tax for
high income, stem cells, pollution, equality in the distribution of
resources, euthanasia, privatization, federalism; a=.77).
Responses were rescaled so that higher scores corresponded to
more conservative political ideology (Mean of the experimental
sample=3.16, SD=.72). Two additional measures were included
in the questionnaire. One 15-item measure assessed Need for
Closure [22] and responses had to be provided along 7-point
Likert scales (a=.72, M=3.82, SD=.85; higher scores indicated
high need for closure). The second measure comprised 18 items
and assessed Need for Cognition [23,24]; responses were provided
Ideology-Based Attentional Asymmetries
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indicated high need for cognition). As expected, overall political
ideology was correlated with both need for closure, r(165)=.19,
p=.01, and need for cognition, r(165)=2.18, p=02. However,
need for closure and need for cognition were not correlated,
r(165)=2.04, ns.
In the laboratory study, participants performed the very same
Dot-Probe Task described in Experiment 2 with positive and
negative images simultaneously presented on the computer screen.
Finally, participants were thanked and fully debriefed during a
class session.
Results
Experiment 1
Emotional Stroop Task. For each participant we calculated
the difference between the mean latency of correct responses for
negative (M=508 ms) and positive words (M=511 ms; overall
less than 3% of errors), so that positive values indicated slower
responses to negative as compared to positive words. In order to
test our main hypothesis, we correlated political ideology and this
difference score, showing a significant association, r(45)=.38,
p=.009. This indicates that more conservative individuals had a
stronger automatic vigilance toward negative as compared to
positive stimuli. Next, we assessed the specific association between
political ideology and responses to the two types of words.
Responses to negative and positive words were regressed to
ideology, and whereas the former were positively associated,
b=.81, t(44)=3.01, p=.004, the latter were negatively associated,
b=2.68, t(44)=22.54, p=.015. These results suggest that
conservatives, as compared to liberals, are more distracted by
negative stimuli but at the same time they show faster responses to
positive stimuli. In order to further explore these findings,
participants were divided in two groups (i.e., split-half) on the
basis of their responses to the ideology scale. Next a 2 (valence of
the words)62 (ideology: liberal vs conservative) analysis of variance
was performed, with the first factor within participants and the
second factor between-participants. Results showed a significant
interaction effect, F(1, 43)=5.23, p,.05 (see Figure 1). In
particular, liberals were slightly faster to respond to negative
than positive words, but the effect was not statistically significant,
p=.25. In contrast, conservatives were significantly slower in their
responses to negative as compared to positive words, t(22)=2.36,
p,.05. Post-hoc tests also showed that the responses of liberals and
conservatives to positive items were not different, p=. 69, whereas
conservatives tended to be slower than liberals when responding to
negative items, p,.05, one-tailed.
Explicit evaluations. First, we calculated the mean for both
negative (a=.89, M=5.6, SD=.62) and positive words (a=.81,
M=1.68, SD=.40). Results showed that political ideology was not
a significant predictor of the evaluation of negative words, b=.20,
t(44)=1.35, p=.18, of positive words, b=.10, t(44)=.64, p=.52,
or of the difference between the evaluation of the two types of
words, b=.11, t(44)=.49, p=.49. The ideology-based difference
emerged from the Emotional Stroop Task cannot thus be
explained by differences in the appraisal of the stimuli.
Results from Experiment 1 clearly showed that conservatives, as
compared to liberals, were more likely to automatically direct their
attentional resources away from the attended task and allocate
them to negative stimuli. Participants’ ideological standing was not
related to the explicit evaluation of the stimuli, but it had a direct
reflection on the automatic reaction to those stimuli. It is
interesting to note that political ideology was assessed by a
different experimenter in a different context, several weeks before
the experimental session, and therefore it was not situationally
activated. This suggests that conservatives and liberals display
chronic differences in their automatic allocation of attentional
resources.
In Experiment 2, we further tested this hypothesis by exploring
the regulation of visual attention. In the former study, participants
were presented with only a single item and the interference of a
task-irrelevant stimulus dimension (i.e., valence) was assessed,
whereas we here briefly presented participants with two stimuli
simultaneously. We employed a Dot-Probe procedure [19,25] in
which participants had to detect the spatial location of a target
which suddenly appeared where either a positive or negative
stimulus had been initially shown. Whereas in Stroop-like tasks
slower responses indicate that the stimulus has grabbed the
Figure 1. Response latencies to positive and negative words as a function of participants’ ideology (Experiment 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026456.g001
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logic of the Dot-Probe task is very different. Indeed, fast response
latencies in this task indicate that participants’ attention was
already oriented toward the stimulus that actually masked the
probe. In contrast, long response latencies signal that participants’
attention had been oriented to the stimulus that had not obscured
the probe. We predicted that conservatives, as compared to
liberals, would be more likely attracted by negative stimuli, and
would thus be faster to detect a probe appearing in the same
spatial location of such negative stimuli.
Experiment 2
Dot-Probe Task. The mean latencies of correct responses
(overall 3.1% of errors) when the dot followed negative and
positive pictures were separately calculated (Ms=452 ms in both
cases). A difference score was computed so that positive values
indicated slower responses after positive as compared to negative
pictures. As expected, this index was positively correlated with
participants’ ideology, r(40)=.36, p=.023. The more a participant
embraced conservative views of the world, the more he/she was
also faster in responding to the dot appearing in the same spatial
location of negative images than positive images. This is consistent
with the idea that conservatives display an attentional bias for
negative stimuli. Next, response latencies to dots following
negative and positive images were regressed to ideology: the
former were negatively associated, b=2.80, t(39)=22.04,
p=.049, whereas the latter were positively associated, b=.95,
t(39)=2.42, p=.02. As in Experiment 1, participants were divided
in two groups on the basis of their responses to the ideology scale
and response latencies were submitted to a 2 (valence of the
images)62 (ideology: liberal vs conservative) analysis of variance.
The predicted interaction effect did not reach the conventional
level of significance, F(1, 38)=2.22, p=.14. However, the
responses of liberals were slightly faster when the dot was
obscured by a positive (M=444, SD=81) rather than a negative
image (M=451, SD=84). The pattern of responses was reversed
in the case of conservatives (positive images: M=460, SD=68;
negative images: M=453, SD=58).
Explicit Evaluation. The evaluation of positive (M=6.05,
SD=.66) and negative images (M=2.29, SD=.82) was calculated.
Results showed that political ideology was not related to the
evaluation of negative, b=2.22, t(39)=21.38, p=.17, or positive
images, b=2.08, t(39)=2.52, p=.60, nor was it related to the
difference between the evaluation of the two types of images,
b=.12, t(39)=.67, p=.51. As in Experiment 1, the ideology-based
difference emerged from the Dot-Probe Task cannot be explained
by differences in the appraisal of the stimuli.
Results from Experiment 2 clearly showed that conservatives, as
compared to liberals, when simultaneously presented with a
negative and a positive stimulus, were more likely to automatically
direct their attention toward the negative one. Conservatives and
liberals provided similar explicit evaluations about the valence of
the presented images, but their automatic attention was differently
affected by the valence of stimuli. In Experiment 3 we further
attempted to replicate this pattern of findings while controlling for
other potentially relevant variables. Indeed, political ideology is
currently conceived as a set of beliefs that enables us to fulfill
relational, epistemic, and existential needs [26]. It is thus a higher-
order construct that subsumes several more specific motivational
drives. For instance, conservatives usually report higher levels of
need for closure [27] but lower levels of need for cognition [23,4].
Thus, we assessed liberals and conservatives automatic attentional
processes while taking into account eventual differences related to
those other motivational factors. More specifically, in Experiment
3 participants were asked to complete the very same task presented
in Experiment 2 and their need for closure and need for cognition
were also assessed. Moreover, in Experiment 3 the measure of
political ideology comprised items related to both social and
economic issues [28,29]. We predicted that, as demonstrated in
Experiment 2, conservatives, as compared to liberals, would be
more likely attracted by negative stimuli, and would thus be faster
to detect a probe appearing in the same spatial location of such
negative stimuli, even when other specific individual differences
(i.e., need for closure and need for cognition) are taken under
control.
Experiment 3
Dot-Probe Task. As in Experiment 2, for each participant
the mean latencies of correct responses when the dot followed
negative (M=441 ms, SD=55) and positive (M=462 ms,
SD=82) images were separately calculated. In a linear
regression analysis, political ideology was negatively related to
latencies when the dot followed a negative image, b=2.67,
t(21)=22.44, p=.025, and positively related to the latencies when
the dot followed a positive image, b=.76, t(21)=2.77, p=.012.
This pattern was confirmed by a 2 (valence of the images)62
(ideology: liberal vs conservative) analysis of variance in which
ideology was considered as a categorical variable. Indeed, a
significant interaction emerged, F(1, 20)=4.89, p,.05 (see
Figure 2). Whereas the responses of liberals did not differ as a
function of the valence of the image that obscured the dot (p..48),
conservatives were significantly faster when the dot appeared in
the same spatial location of a negative rather than positive image,
p,.05.
Next, a difference score was computed in such a way that
positive scores indicated faster responses after negative as
compared to positive pictures. A preliminary analysis showed that
this score was significantly correlated with participants’ ideology,
r(22)=.53, p=.013, thus replicating what observed in Experiment
2. In a linear regression analysis, this index was then entered as a
dependent variable whereas political ideology, need for cognition
and need for closure were simultaneously entered as independent
variables. As expected, only political ideology emerged to be a
significant predictor of the performance in the Dot-Probe Task,
b=.51, t(21)=2.61, p=.018. More specifically conservatives were
faster when the dot followed a negative images as compared to
positive images. The effects of need for closure, b=.16, t(21)=.80,
and need for cognition, b=2.11, t(21)=2.56, were not
significant. Separate scores about the economic and social issues
addressed in the ideology scale were also calculated and they
proved to be weakly correlated, r=.33, p=.12. Both the social,
r=.48, p,.05 and the economic dimensions scores, r=.37, p=.09,
were associated to the difference scores between responses to
positive and negative stimuli.
Discussion
Research has widely explored the differences between conser-
vatives and liberals, and dozens of studies indicate that several
variables like dogmatism, intolerance for ambiguity and disorder,
fear of threat, and death anxiety are more closely tied to
conservatives [6,9,30,26,4]. Some of these variables (e.g., fear of
threat) suggest that negativity has a special value for conservatives,
and recent research has indeed found ideology-based asymmetri-
cal reactions to positive and negative stimuli, both in terms of
physiological reactions [14], and intended strategies while
exploring novel stimuli [15]. In the current work we explored
the role of basic attentional processes, hypothesizing that people
Ideology-Based Attentional Asymmetries
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would also display attentional mechanisms that prioritize the
processing of negative information appearing in the environment.
Results from three studies consistently support the existence of
ideology-based differences in the automatic allocation of atten-
tional resources. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that
negative stimuli were more likely to grab the attention of
conservatives, interfering with the execution of the primary task
they had to perform (i.e., color-naming). Results from Experiment
2 and 3 further evidenced that ideology was related to spatial
attention, and conservatives were more likely to quickly direct
their attention toward negative images. Moreover, Experiment 3
clearly demonstrated that these effects remain significant even
controlling for other relevant motivational factors, such as need for
closure and need for cognition, thus providing further support to
the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance and threat management
are two largely independent motivational factors associated with
conservativism [31]. In the current studies, responses to positive
and negative stimuli were contrasted and this does not allow us to
clearly determine whether findings are primarily driven by
conservatives’ attentional bias towards negative stimuli or liberals’
bias towards positive stimuli. For instance, in the Dot-Probe task
employed in Experiment 2 and 3 the prioritization of one kind of
stimuli necessarily implies a decreased attention to the other kind
of stimuli. In the Stroop task employed in Experiment 1 responses
to positive and negative stimuli were independent, and results are
more in line with the idea that ideological orientation is more
strongly related to responses toward negative than positive stimuli.
However, although the present studies strongly support the
hypothesis of ideology-based attentional asymmetries in the
processing of valenced information, future research will have to
compare responses to neutral and affectively-laden items and
assess whether responses toward positive stimuli are also associated
with ideological orientations.
Thanks to attentional processes people filter the incoming
information and left-right ideological differences appear to shape
these early automatic processes. As a consequence, conservatives,
as compared to liberals, may indeed build up discrepant
representations of the world with the former being more biased
toward negativity. The outcome of this automatic selective
attention for threatening information, in turn, may then further
increase the motivation to embrace ideological conservatism as a
way to manage uncertainty and threat [4,32–34].
Ideological identification permeates our daily personal and social
life. The key message is that this influence appears to emerge at very
early stages of stimulus processing, indicating that negative
information exerts a stronger automatic attention-grabbing power
in the case of political conservatives, as compared to liberals. Thus,
basic attentional processes differentiate right- and left-wingers, and
they may represent one of the cognitive underpinnings creating and
sustaining ideology-based different perceptions of the outside world.
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